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Abstract Some brain injured patients are left in a
permanent vegetative state, i.e., they have irreversibly lost
their capacity for consciousness but retained some auto-
nomic physiological functions, such as breathing unaided.
Having discussed the controversial nature of the permanent
vegetative state as a diagnostic category, we turn to the
question of the patients’ ontological status. Are the per-
manently vegetative alive, dead, or in some other state?
We present empirical data from interviews with relatives of
patients, and with experts, to support the view that the
ontological state of permanently vegetative patients is
unclear: such patients are neither straightforwardly alive
nor simply dead. Having defended this view from counter-
arguments we turn to the practical question as to how these
patients ought to be treated. Some relatives and experts
believe it is right for patients to be shifted from their cur-
rently unclear ontological state to that of being straight-
forwardly dead, but many are concerned or even horrified
by the only legally sanctioned method guaranteed to
achieve this, namely withdrawal of clinically assisted
nutrition and hydration. A way of addressing this distress
would be to allow active euthanasia for these patients. This
is highly controversial; but we argue that standard objec-
tions to allowing active euthanasia for this particular class
of permanently vegetative patients are weakened by these
patients’ distinctive ontological status.
Keywords Defining death  End-of-life  Euthanasia 
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Introduction
How shall we regard those in [PermVS]? They are
periodically awake, and their bodies breathe and
digest on their own. These traits bespeak life. Yet
they are not conscious and never will be: subjec-
tively, this is death (Wikler 1988, p. 41)
Catastrophic brain injuries have various causes including
trauma due to accidents, anoxia (lack of oxygen) due, for
example, to cardiac arrest, and illnesses such as viral
encephalitis. Brain injured patients fall into various diagnostic
categories. The vegetative state (VS) refers to patients who
have suffered damage to parts of the brain responsible for
consciousness but who retain sufficient brain stem activity to
maintain some autonomic physiological functions, including
spontaneous breathing and stable circulation.1 The minimally
conscious state (MCS) was introduced as a diagnostic cate-
gory in 2002 for patients who demonstrate minimal but clearly
discernible behavioural evidence of awareness of themselves
or their environment (Giacino et al. 2002).2 Patients in MCS
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1 Clinicians sometimes use ‘consciousness’ to refer to both wake-
fulness and awareness; patients in VS exhibit wakefulness, including
eye closure and opening which give the appearance of a sleep-wake
cycle, but lack awareness of themselves or their environment. In
accordance with philosophical usage, however, in this article we
restrict ‘consciousness’ to meaning conscious awareness.
2 Conditions related to—and sometimes confused with—MCS which
are not the focus of this article include locked-in syndrome and long-
term profound cognitive and physical disabilities.
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show inconsistent, but reproducible, responses above the level
of spontaneous or reflexive behaviour, which indicate some
degree of interaction with their surroundings.
Of these diagnoses, this article focuses on the vegetative
state (VS).3 This is further subdivided into ‘persistent’ (or
‘continuing’) VS on the one hand, and ‘permanent’ VS on
the other. The subdivision is based on duration of the state
of unconsciousness (in the absence of complicating but
reversible factors which might suppress consciousness). In
the UK, a patient who has been in VS due to anoxic or
other metabolic injury for at least 6 months, or in VS due
to trauma for 12 months, is diagnosed as being in a per-
manent VS.4 To diagnose a patient as being permanently
vegetative is to predict that their loss of capacity for con-
sciousness is irreversible.5 Permanent VS (PermVS) is the
specific focus of this article.
We are acutely aware of the controversial nature of the
permanent vegetative state. Specifically, ethical discus-
sions such as ours are based on two premises: that PermVS
exists, and that we can know which brain injured patients
are in this state. Both premises are said to be belied by
clinical realities. In particular, recent evidence suggests
that some PermVS patients may retain a degree of con-
scious awareness; there are well publicised cases of
patients emerging from what was thought to be a perma-
nent vegetative state; and our current understanding of the
neurological basis of consciousness is not sufficiently
refined to diagnose a vegetative state as permanent with
complete confidence (Fins 2008). Given this, it is suggested
that PermVS is a hypothetical scenario—a thought
experiment rather than a clinical reality—so philosophical
discussion of the ethics of the treatment of the permanently
vegetative is at best academic and at worst dangerous
(Borthwick 1995).
We acknowledge that it is important to continue to
clarify the clinical realities of the permanent vegetative
state. But the implications of recent scientific work in this
area are contested,6 and, whilst recent developments and
refinements might enable the detection and correction of
misdiagnoses, they do not establish that all vegetative
patients retain a degree of conscious awareness.7 Regard-
ing the epistemological problem, knowledge does not
require certainty, so the premise that one cannot be certain
that a patient is in a permanent vegetative state does not
entail that one cannot know that they are. This is in keeping
with the fact that medicine is rife with uncertainty; Perm-
VS, like other diagnostic categories, admits of the possi-
bility of error.8 Finally, diagnostic categories for brain
injured patients may well be vague in the philosophical
sense that there is no bright line between them; but vague
boundaries are still boundaries so it remains plausible that a
subcategory of patients are, and can be known to be, in
PermVS.
Two other considerations suggest that discussing the
ethics of treatment of PermVS patients is appropriate and
urgent, not redundant. First, it is a medical reality that
patients are currently diagnosed as permanently vegetative,
and managed accordingly, so whether their treatment is
ethical is a pertinent question notwithstanding ongoing
investigation into the condition. Second, even if were true
that all vegetative patients retain or regain conscious
awareness, in many cases this would be extremely minimal
and nothing akin to what is usually meant by a centre of
consciousness. Discussion of the ethical treatment of this
subcategory of brain injured patients is important even if
they are not ‘permanently vegetative’ in the standard sense.
In sum, discussions of the ethics of treatment of patients
diagnosed as permanently vegetative should proceed not-
withstanding the controversial nature of, and ongoing
neurological research into, the condition.
A final introductory point concerns methodology. This
paper engages with a bioethical issue by drawing on
3 We are aware that the term ‘vegetative state’ is not universally
condoned—notably, in mainland Europe (see, e.g., Laureys et al.
2010)—but we prefer it because it remains well established in the UK
where the interviews we draw on were conducted (Royal College of
Physicians 2003).
4 Lengths of time are disparate because the likelihood of recovery
from anoxic injury is lower than that of recovery from brain trauma;
see Royal College of Physicians (2003, 14). Incidentally, another
RCP Working Party report has gone to press as we write—the third
author of the present article is a member of the committee—with the
new guidelines being published in December 2013 (Royal College of
Physicians 2013). In the USA, the Multi-Society Task Force on
Persistent Vegetative State concluded that a patient’s condition is
‘permanent three months after non-traumatic and 12 months after
traumatic injury’, where ‘permanent’ means that recovery is ‘exceed-
ingly rare’ (Multi-Society Task Force 1994).
5 By contrast, ‘whole brain death’ (WBD) occurs when all parts of
the brain – those responsible for consciousness and those responsible
for physiological functions—are irreversibly damaged such that
physiological activity, including breathing and circulation, requires
mechanical support. The controversy over the fact that whole brain
dead patients are declared legally dead in the UK and the USA is well
documented (Miller and Truog 2010) and have recently received
extensive media publicity with public debate about two US cases, Jahi
McMath and Marlise Mun˜oz (e.g., http://www.nytimes.com/2014/01/
10/health/the-science-behind-brain-death.html?hp&_r=3). See also
the neurologist quoted in footnote 19.
6 Monti et al. (2010). See also Cruse et al. (2011), Goldfine et al.
(2013), Dyer (2013). For a response to diagnostic uncertainties see
Fischer and Truog (2013).
7 Hence, ‘results show that a small proportion of patients in a
vegetative or minimally conscious state have brain activation
reflecting some awareness and cognition. Careful clinical examination
will result in reclassification of the state of consciousness in some of
these patients’ (Monti et al. 2010, 579).
8 Though the rate of error in diagnosing and differentiating cases of
PermVS and MCS is notably high; see Andrews et al. (1996),
Schnakers et al. (2009).
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empirical research. The relationship between ethics and
empirical research is vexed. The controversy centres on
empirical ethics, ‘a broad category, grasping different
interpretations of combining or trying to integrate ethics
and empirical research’ (Borry et al. 2004, p. 1). A standard
objection to empirical ethics is that it commits the natu-
ralistic fallacy by deriving normative, evaluative, ethical
conclusions from naturalistic—typically, social scientific—
premises. In other words, empirical ethicists tell us what
ought to be done on the basis of what people think, say,
believe or do. There are various theoretical responses to
this challenge (de Vries and Gordijn 2009) but our
approach avoids the naturalistic fallacy altogether. This is
because we do not base (bio)ethical conclusions (about
how PermVS patients ought to be treated) directly on
empirical data (relatives’ and others’ views). Rather, we
use empirical data directly to support claims about the
concept and nature of death and, specifically, the onto-
logical state of PermVS patients. In turn, we draw bio-
ethical implications from these conclusions. That the
ontological status of a patient has normative significance is
beyond doubt—for example, that a patient is dead entails
that it can be permissible to retrieve their organs—so there
is no dubious dialectical move in our argument from nat-
uralistic premises to ethical conclusions.9
The ontological status of PermVS patients
The general problematic is how permanently vegetative
patients ought to be treated. There are various consider-
ations, such as autonomy (respecting the wishes of the
patient) and societal implications of end-of-life policies.
The one we focus on here is the ontological status of the
patient. That this is important is clear; for example, if they
are already dead then harvesting transplant organs from
PermVS patients who had wished to donate would not
contravene the ‘dead donor rule’ that no one should be
killed by organ retrieval. What, then, is the ontological
condition of the PermVS patient: alive, dead, or some other
state?
This turns on a debate about death centring on three
related questions. (1) The definition of death: what is
death? (2) The determination of death: what has to happen
to a creature for it to die? (3) The diagnosis of death: how
are we to test for the occurrence of death in particular
cases? The current ethical and legal landscape is dominated
by a biological paradigm: (1) death is irreversible break-
down in the functioning of the organism as a whole; (2) for
human beings, this occurs when the brain is irreversibly
incapable of maintaining integrative organismic function-
ing; (3) clinical tests for whether a brain is in this state have
been devised, such as the apnea test (in some countries,
such as the UK, death is determined by the state of the
brain stem because irreversible loss of all brain stem
functions is inevitably followed by holistic organismic
breakdown). According to the biological paradigm, Perm-
VS patients are alive because they display autonomic
physiological functioning, despite their irreversible loss of
consciousness.10
But the biological paradigm is contested. Notably,
advocates of a consciousness-based paradigm for death
claim: (1) death for human beings is irreversible loss of the
capacity for consciousness; (2) this occurs when parts of
the brain responsible for consciousness are irreversibly
damaged; and (3) the principal diagnostic tests for death
are techniques to establish, for example, a patient’s lack of
awareness of themselves or their environment, and lack of
response to stimuli. According to this consciousness-based
paradigm, PermVS patients are dead despite autonomic
physiological functioning because of their irreversible loss
of capacity for consciousness.11
Holland (2010) has argued that paradigms such as the
biological and consciousness-based are reductivist and fail
to capture the complexity of the phenomenon.12 He sug-
gests that clarifying the way death is ordinarily conceived
is more important to defining death than alternative
approaches, such as empirical investigation, metaphysical
theorising, or asking experts. Our ordinary concept of death
includes the definition familiar from the biological para-
digm—i.e., death is irreversible breakdown in the func-
tioning of the organism as a whole—but also involves
thoughts such as, for someone who has died, it will never
again be like anything to be them. So, our ordinary concept
of death has at least two conceptual components, one
biological (death is about how organisms cease to
9 For sustained discussion of empirical ethics, see Vol 5, no. 1 (2004)
of this journal; Vol 23, no. 4 (2009) of Bioethics.
10 For presentation, defence, refinement, and application of the
biological paradigm, see, respectively, Bernat et al. (1981), Bernat
(1998, 1999), Lamb (1996).
11 An early advocate of consciousness-based accounts is Veatch
(1975). Lizza (1993, 2006) has consistently defended higher brain
accounts, including arguing that a creature goes out of existence with
the loss of essential properties; for human beings, personhood is an
essential property; consciousness is necessary for personhood; so the
PermVS patient, who has irreversibly lost capacity for consciousness,
is dead because they have lost an essential property. See also Rich
(1997).
12 Holland distances this account from similar sounding views, such
as the ‘two-deaths’ view that human beings literally die two deaths
(that of the person and that of the organism) and that ‘death’ is an
ambiguous term which has one meaning when applied to people and a
different meaning when used of other organisms; cf. Shrader (1986),
McMahan (1995).
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function), the other consciousness-based (death is about
never again being a centre of consciousness). No doubt the
concept of death is even richer, including perspectives
provided by, for example, religious frameworks and idio-
syncratic beliefs.
On Holland’s account, when faced with what are
sometimes called ‘ambiguous cases’ such as PermVS
patients, we are unsure about their ontological status. In
other words, we struggle to understand whether they are
alive, dead, or in some other state. On the one hand, these
patients are alive according to the biological definition,
which is central to our ordinary understanding of death. On
the other hand, non-biological components of our ordinary
concept—notably, the consciousness-based thought that
death is a matter of never again enjoying any thoughts,
sensations or experiences—fit the condition of a PermVS
patient, which leads us to think and talk of them as being
dead (or, at least, not straightforwardly alive).
Data from interviews with relatives of PermVS patients
That the ordinary understanding of death includes, but is
richer than, the biological definition, and that people
struggle conceptually over the ontological status of Perm-
VS patients, are claims about how real people think and
talk, how they conceptualise matters. Are these claims
true? We pursue this question by reference to empirical
data from interviews with relatives of severely brain
injured patients, conducted by the second and third authors,
who themselves have a severely brain injured sister. Over
fifty interviews have so far been completed. Although the
focus of this paper is PermVS patients, other diagnostic
categories mentioned above are represented in the study,
including patients whose vegetative state is persistent but
not yet permanent, minimally conscious patients, and some
cases of uncertain diagnosis (for example, patients whose
condition is borderline between vegetative and minimally
conscious).
Interviews were semi-structured; an interview schedule
was used but conversations were allowed to develop nat-
urally in unforeseen ways. Interviews were recorded,
transcribed and thematically coded. Extracts quoted here
have been anonymised, and names of people and places are
pseudonyms. Here we focus primarily on family interviews
with respondents who have accepted a PermVS diagnosis
for their relative (i.e., they report believing that their rel-
ative has lost, and is extremely unlikely ever to regain,
awareness of self or environment). We also draw on a
second data set compiled from interviews with profes-
sionals working on disorders of consciousness—such as
consultant neurologists and legal experts—using a similar
protocol (except that some respondents asked to be named;
of these, only one is quoted here, James Howe, and all
other names of family members and professionals used in
this article are pseudonyms).13
Do the interview data reveal an understanding of death
so rich and complex as to cause research participants to
struggle with the ontological status of PermVS patients, in
accordance with Holland’s analysis?14 Explicitly and
implicitly, interviewees repeatedly speak of patients as
being alive and yet to die. Such discourse clearly concords
with the biological paradigm in which death is defined as
irreversible breakdown in functioning of the organism as a
whole: in that paradigm, PermVS patients are still alive
because they maintain integrated autonomic physiological
functions. So, for example, Tania, the mother of a PermVS
son (pseudonymised as ‘Charlie’), states explicitly that he
is still alive despite the fact that people she had thought of
as friends no longer ask about him:
Tania: You know they’ll cross the road rather than speak
to you and they talk about- Often they talk to me
and they say ‘‘oh, how is Spencer [another son]?’’
or ‘‘how is your mum?’’ Very rarely will they ask
about Charlie and I’m thinking, ‘‘He’s still alive!’’
Another interviewee, Brian, implies that his relative is
alive by way of contrast with his projected future death:
‘‘Yeah. While I’d be heartbroken if he died, it’s a funny-
it’s like almost a- as if it would be a sense of relief if it was
to happen.’’ Comments of this kind were so frequent as to
suggest that this is a natural and familiar way for respon-
dents to think and talk about the patients.15
But the crucial finding is that this does not fully capture
how interviewees understand the patients’ ontological
state. Specifically, at various points in interviews, respon-
dents with a relative in a permanent vegetative state
struggled to explain the patient’s ontological status by
refusing to speak of them as straightforwardly alive, and
even explicitly talking about them as being already dead.
The first representative extract presented here is drawn
from a joint interview with the patient’s brother, Harry, and
Harry’s partner, Natalie.
13 For further details about the data set, see Kitzinger and Kitzinger
2013, 2014.
14 One might question our extrapolating from comments by respon-
dents, who are in extraordinary circumstances, to our ordinary
concept of death. But the family member interviewees are ideal
informants because they are not professionals working on neurolog-
ical damage (medics, lawyers, etc.) yet they have been forced by
circumstances to understand the condition and reflect on its ontolog-
ical implications. They are non-naı¨ve laypersons.
15 They also count heavily against sole reliance on the consciousness-
based paradigm according to which PermVS patients are straightfor-
wardly dead (see, e.g., Wikler 1988): our respondents are perfectly
clear that it is apposite to talk about the patient, and not just their
body, as being still alive.
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Natalie: What we are convinced about is that uhm, from
everything that we can find out, it is not in Zoe’s
[the patient’s] best interest to be still alive.
‘Cause she’s existing. She isn’t living
Int: Mm
Harry: I mean there’s a line where it says clinicians are
good at fixing bodies but they’re not good at
fixing brains
Int: Yeah. You’ve said she’s existing, not living, and
I think you [Harry] said earlier she- that the Zoe
you knew died 4 years ago
Harry: She did, yeah
Int: Uhm, how do you make sense of the body in the
bed? Is she- it’s kind of between life and death
somehow?
Harry: No she- As far as I’m concerned- Well yeah,
obviously, it’s between life and death. You’re in
no man’s land, basically.
The interviewer’s phrase ‘the body in the bed’ is reso-
nant with the experience of many family members whose
relatives are in PermVS, and is used spontaneously by
some interviewees, along with references to the patient as a
‘shell’ or a ‘husk’. For example, Jade comments,
It feels like it’s just a body. It’s Colin’s body being
kept alive somehow. He’s not in it anymore […] It’s
just a shell. It’s a shell of a body. It’s so- so damaged,
the brain. I feel that it’s not Colin anymore. […] It
isn’t a life. Is it even an existence?
Likewise, Rhiannon says, ‘‘We don’t want to lose them.
We want to keep them here with us. But all you’re keeping
is a shell.’’
Brian also describes his brother’s body as a ‘‘shell’’, and
uses a range of other formulations to try to capture his
brother’s current ontological condition: ‘‘the body’s there but
the engine’s gone’’; ‘‘there’s a case there and somebody’s
taken the motherboard out’’; and, ‘‘as the old saying goes, the
lights are on but there’s nobody in’’. Although Brian was
quoted earlier as saying that he’d be ‘‘heartbroken if he [his
brother] died’’—thereby implying that his brother is not
dead—elsewhere in the interview he also talks about his
brother as already dead: ‘‘I don’t mean this nastily or anything
else like that- but possibly to me, Aaron died the day [of the
assault that led to his brain injury]’’. At several points in the
interview he states in quick succession both that his brother is
‘‘already dead’’ and that he is ‘‘not dead’’; for example,
Brian: He’s already dead. The only reason he’s not dead
is because his heart pumps […] And we’re not
sure whether he reasons because we don’t know
enough. But what we do know, or what
information we have got at this present time, is
he’s effectively dead
This struggle to articulate what being ‘effectively dead’
amounts to emerges when Aaron is compared to friends
who are ‘really dead’:
Brian: I said, ‘‘So Aaron hasn’t got a life to lead. Or
live.’’ And I suppose that is the difference
between Aaron and my friends that have died,
right? They’ve died. Their life’s ended, and it’s
gone. Aaron is alive but he hasn’t got a life to live.
I don’t know if that makes sense.16
Another interviewee, whose mother had died after being
vegetative for more than 3 years, displays similar uncer-
tainty, on the one hand agreeing that his mother effectively
died in the car crash that caused the brain injuries leading
her to become permanently vegetative (such that he ‘‘didn’t
believe she was really there anymore’’) but also talking
about how he treated her body ‘‘just in case I was
wrong’’:17
Int: From your point of view, did you lose your mother,
did she in effect die in the accident?
Tim: Yeah. Yeah. Of course it’s more comforting to
think of it like that. So I suppose that that’s what I
latched onto
Int: So how did you relate to the body in the bed, that
was –
Tim: Oh well, not in a- not- (laughs) Yeah, you might
think that you’d just be kind of careless or uh, or
dismissive of it, but not at all. […] On the one hand
I was confident and comfort- I was comfortable
with the idea of withdrawing nutrition because I
didn’t believe that she was- uh was really there
anymore. And if she had been there she would have
hated it. But on the other hand, just in case I was
wrong, I would- I and everybody else involved
would be- would treat her with dignity and respect
and try and look after her.18
16 An interesting variant on this is that some of our respondents spoke
unguardedly of their relatives being dead before correcting them-
selves; e.g., ‘actually if Bella were alive, oh! say again, if Bella were
awake, conscious and had got a mouthpiece, she would have …’
17 In contrast to Tim’s comments, Lizza (1993, p. 358–359) suggests
that ‘when people understand the medical reality of [PermVS] they
often engage in … ‘death behavior’’. But Lizza uses this to endorse
his higher brain account on which PermVS patients are dead: ‘since
no one finds such ‘death behaviour’ bizarre, it is socially acceptable.
We thus have some reason to believe that society views… individuals
in PermVS as dead’. By contrast, we argue that our respondents are in
a quandary about their relative’s ontological status: their ‘death
behaviour’ co-exists with repeated implicit and explicit statements
that the patient is still alive, and with behaviour—such as Tim’s—
which is concordant with the patient’s being alive.
18 The point was made in passing that no doubt our ordinary concept
of death is even richer than the awkward conjunction of thoughts
captured by the biological and consciousness-based paradigms. Other
aspects of our understanding of death are provided by, for example,
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The same uncertainty about ontological status arises in
interviews with professionals working in the area of dis-
orders of consciousness, such as court expert witnesses,
including consultant neurologists. For example, we inter-
viewed the neurologist, James Howe, who was involved
with the ground-breaking case of Tony Bland which
established that treatment withdrawal could be legally
permitted for PermVS patients in the UK.19 In this inter-
view we pressed Howe on Bland’s ontological status at the
point of treatment withdrawal:
Int: And when you withdrew treatment from Tony
Bland, you didn’t feel you were killing him? You
felt he’d been killed by the Hillsborough disaster?
Jim: He was already dead. Mr Bland [his father] said that
he was already dead. ‘‘My son was already dead.’’
Int: But his heart was beating. He was breathing
unaided.
Jim: Yes, that’s right. Yeah.
Int: How is that dead?
Jim: Well, it is dead because what matters is
consciousness. […] With the extinction of
consciousness then the individual is dead. It doesn’t
matter what your heart’s doing; it’s just a pump.
[…]
Int: So for you, not being dead means being conscious,
at least some of the time?
Jim: Yes. Yes, that’s right.20
Howe’s comment are so forthright that he might seem to
be claiming that Tony Bland is straightforwardly dead; but
he advocated treatment withdrawal precisely in order to shift
Tony Bland’s ontological status to that of ‘really dead’.
In sum, evidence from interview data accumulates to
support the view that our ordinary concept of death is more
complex than that of a solely biological phenomenon, and
this creates conceptual uncertainty about the ontological
status of PermVS patients.21
Literal and metaphorical uses of ontological concepts
One objection to the foregoing is that when interviewees
say the PermVS patient is alive and not dead, they are
using these terms literally; by contrast, when they talk of
the patients being dead, they are speaking metaphorically:
‘Only living organisms can die … Use of the word
‘death’ or ‘die’ outside of this strict biological context is
acceptable but is metaphorical’ (Bernat 1998, p. 15). Does
empirical evidence support this objection? One reason for
thinking not is based on a discernible contrast with dis-
course pertaining to minimally conscious patients. The
MCS patient is alive on all standard definitions of death
(and on Holland’s original analysis because, notwith-
standing its complexity, our ordinary understanding of
death does not extend to thinking of patients whose
consciousness is very minimal as dead). But relatives of
Footnote 18 continued
religious commitments and idiosyncratic beliefs. Evidence from the
interview data supports this. For example, some interviewees strug-
gled to explain where their relative’s soul currently resides. Tania
asks rhetorically, ‘‘where’s his soul? No, his soul’s still- And I- I- I
just thought that yeah, his soul has got to be there. Because I had this
horror of it kind of like [pause] sort of floating around somewhere lo-
and he was lost. You know like a lost soul […] Because he’s not- He’s
still alive. He’s still breathing. His heart is still beating, so his soul is
still obviously intact within his body.’’
19 Airedale NHS Trust v Bland [1993]. Another neurologist reveals
his uncertainty about the ontological status of PermVS patients whilst
declining to accept the ethical distinction (though in practice of
course implementing the legal distinction) between PermVS and
WBD: ‘‘It’s only a legal nicety that defines brain stem dead people as
dead at the time you make the diagnosis of ‘brain stem death’, rather
than at the time they are dead. It’s a legal nicety, that’s all. […] I think
that brain stem dead people are as alive or as dead as somebody who
is actually in the permanent vegetative state.’’
20 This theme was present throughout the original Bland ruling:
But for patients like Nancy Cruzan, who have no consciousness
and no chance of recovery, there is a serious question as to
whether the mere persistence of their bodies is ‘life,’ as that
word is commonly understood… the idea of life is not con-
ceived separately from the idea of a living person.
[…]To his parents and family he is ‘dead.’ His spirit has left
him and all that remains is the shell of his body. This is kept
functioning as a biological unit by the artificial process of
Footnote 20 continued
feeding through a mechanically operated nasogastric tube.
Intensive attention by skilled nurses assists the continuation of
the existence of the body.
The fact that Anthony Bland’s existence will terminate does
not in my judgment alter the reality that the true cause of death
will be the massive injuries which he sustained in what has
been described as the Hillsborough disaster.
(All quotes from: [1993] 1 All ER 821 Airedale NHS Trust v Bland.
http://ebookily.org/pdf/1993-1-all-er-821-airedale-nhs-trust-v-bland-
124434330.html. Accessed 10 January 2014.)
21 Some previous research in which ordinary people reflect on the
ontological status of people in PermVS supports our analysis. E.g.,
wives of patients in a persistent vegetative state refer to their
husbands as ‘‘neither alive nor dead’’ (Hamama-Raz et al. 2013).
Lotto et al. (2012) tested whether the perceived ontological status of
PermVS, MCS, locked-in syndrome, and terminally ill patients,
correlates with adherence to one of two life-ending principles, the
sanctity of life principle (SL) and the principle of free choice (FC).
They found that, ‘the more people believe in the FC, the more they
perceived patients as dead in pathologies where conscious awareness
is severely impaired. By contrast, participants who agree with the
Sanctity of Life (SL) principle did not show differences across
pathologies.’ This supports our view that people do not have a solely
biological understanding of death: ‘for the supporters of the FC
principle, as opposed to those who agree with the SL principle,
conscious awareness seems to be central in defining what it does
mean to be alive.’
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MCS patients sometimes seem to equivocate over their
loved-one’s ontological status. Nonetheless, it seems clear
that there is not the serious struggle to conceptualise MCS
patients which characterises interviews with respondents
who have a relative in PermVS. This next extract, from
an interview with someone whose brother is in MCS, is
illustrative.
Int: And is there a part of you that feels you’ve lost
your brother?
Trevor: Yes. Yeah, there is ‘I’ve lost my brother’ but,
you know, if we start wallowing in ‘lost your
brother’, the only way to be positive is to help
him to get back.
Int: Yep.
Trevor: If I, at the beginning, thought I’d lost my brother,
blah, blah, blah, he wouldn’t be where he is now.
The attitude is you’ve got to try and get him
back, give him the chance. I’m sure if he didn’t
want to live, he could easily have died. He could
have easily died himself.
For this interviewee, the patient in MCS is hard to
communicate with and changed from who he was, but
clearly not dead. He takes a positive perspective on
‘‘help[ing] him to get back’’ to something like the life he
had. Another interviewee whose relative was in MCS but
has subsequently died of natural causes describes her
interaction with him in a way that clearly displays that,
in her view, not only was he definitely not dead, but also
he was sufficiently alive to have the agency and com-
municative ability to convey to her that he wanted to be
dead:
Elspeth: He appeared to lean forward and tell me that he
wanted to die- in obviously not so many words
[…] And at another point as well where I said to
him- he was in so much pain, breathing really
difficult and I said ‘‘Ian, I just wish there was
something I could do.’’ And he again leant out
and looked at me. And to me that meant ‘there is
something you can fucking do’… And it just—it
suddenly became really clear that that’s what we
had to do is to help him do that. And [that’s]
when we went to see the lawyer [to get advice
about withdrawing treatment].
For both Trevor and Elspeth their brother is clearly
alive, though Trevor believes his MCS brother wants to
remain alive, whereas Elspeth believes her MCS brother
would rather be dead. The patient has ‘lost the life they
had’ and each is (according to their sibling) reacting to that
in a different way. So here the distinction between literal
and metaphorical discourse about the patients’ ontology is
apposite: respondents’ talk of the MCS patient being alive
is literal; their acute sense that the person they knew before
the injury having ‘gone’ leads them to speak metaphori-
cally of their being dead. By contrast, the discourse illus-
trated in the previous section about PermVS patients is not
metaphorical but, rather, expresses respondents’ struggle to
articulate the PermVS patients’ ontological state.22
Practical implications
What are the practical implications of the unclear onto-
logical status of PermVS patients? We pursue the issue that
is uppermost for the interviewees. All the interviewees who
accepted the PermVS diagnosis at some point in their
interview stated that they wanted the situation to be
resolved by their relative being moved from their currently
unclear state to having clearly died, even though such a
shift might unleash a new layer of grief alongside a sense
of relief.23 For example, Tania comments,
I will be brutally honest and say all I have wanted for
a long time is for Charles to be at peace. People say to
me, still, you know, ‘‘You must never give up hope;
there’s always hope.’’ But after almost 9 years, I’m
sorry but my hope is that Charles finds peace.
Far from being thoughtless, such views accord with
established principles of medical ethics, notably that
treatment should be in the best interest of the patient, and
respect for patient autonomy. For example, Tim comments,
‘‘I couldn’t say that her best interests were served by
maintaining the functionality of her body until she died of
old age in 20 years’ time’’ and, ‘‘I know that she would
have been greatly distressed if she could have known that
22 Lotto et al. (2012) report a correlation between believing in the
principle of free choice in life-ending decisions and perceiving both
PermVS and MCS patients as dead. But this does not count against
our claim that when people suggest that MSC patients are dead they
are speaking metaphorically. Lotto et al.’s study consists of asking
participants ‘how dead or how alive’ are certain sorts of patients, a
methodology incapable of teasing out subtleties such as uncertainty
about ‘death status’, and literal versus metaphorical uses of ontolog-
ical terms. By contrast, our qualitative approach centring on in-depth
interviews with relatives of PermVS patients is well suited to teasing
out such subtleties. (For a similar critique of a different empirical
study, see Holland 2010, p. 115.)
23 A terminological difficulty should be explicitly noted here. In our
discussion we use phrases such as ‘life sustaining interventions’ and
‘bring about death’ for the sake of brevity: as is clear from the
foregoing, our view is that the PermVS patient is not straightfor-
wardly alive; but their currently unclear ontological state can be
changed to one of being ‘really dead’ by withdrawing the support
required to sustain their capacity for autonomic physiological
functions. This terminological awkwardness is a general challenge
for writers on this topic and sometimes results in new locutions, such
as Miller and Truog’s (2010) preference for ‘somatic support’ as
opposed to the clearly question-begging phrase, ‘life support’.
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she would have been condemned to live this long in such a
condition.’’24
Does the current legal situation support these views?
PermVS patients are maintained by life-sustaining inter-
ventions, principally, artificial nutrition and hydration
(ANH). Often (and from here in this article) this is referred
to as ‘clinically assisted nutrition and hydration’ (CANH)
to draw attention to its status as medical treatment. On the
basis of precedents such as Quinlan, Cruzan, and Schiavo
in the US, and Bland in the UK, it is legally permissible
(indeed, even appropriate) under certain circumstances to
apply for a court order to withdraw CANH.25 But many
interviewees are horrified by the prospect of their relative
being treated in this way. This is understandable notwith-
standing the presumption—which, recall, is never cer-
tain—that patients diagnosed as permanently vegetative are
incapable of experiencing unpleasant sensations.
Tania: We hated it. They reassured us that, you know,
‘‘Oh he would be sedated, he wouldn’t feel any
pain.’’ But we would have to sit there for up to
3 weeks to, basically, watch him die. Craig
[patient’s brother] said, ‘‘but it’s so awful Mum-
I couldn’t bear for them to do that to Charles’’.
There’s no way I’d ask for it. No way.
Harry concurs: ‘‘There are ways and means of doing it
compassionately, but instead we’re going to withdraw
nutrition and hydration when we could actually […] give
her a drug to go to sleep forever.’’
Some of the neurologists we interviewed agreed that
withdrawal of treatment was not in the best interests of the
patient when there were quicker ways of bringing about
their death. For example, one consultant neurologist rec-
ommended palliative sedation.
Neurologist: I think that the means of death needs to be
as quick and easy and painless as both the
law and the clinical team themselves are
prepared to do. The law tells you at the
moment that you cannot actually inject
insulin or other agents […] then a decent
amount of sedatives, not sort of injecting
enough to kill them immediately, but to
make sure that progressively and rapidly- so
it’s under some sort of control
Int: So- okay. So palliative care that is-
Neurologist: Sort of what you might call positive
palliative care rather than reactive
palliative care
Int: Terminal sedation?
Neurologist: Yeah.
The same neurologist puts the point by reference to the
doctrine of double effect (though this was not appealed to
in Bland):
Neurologist: … once we say in the court or wherever we
say we’re going to withdraw hydration, I
mean, we’re essentially saying we’re going
to kill this person. I mean, there is no other
outcome. And we’re doing this knowing
that’s going to be the outcome, there is no
other benefit, there is no- It’s not a sort of
second- you know, when you give
morphine to relieve pain and you happen
to think-
Int: Double effect
Neurologist: That’s right. There’s no double effect of
this. There’s only a single effect. The
withdrawal of hydration causes death. And
if there is a double effect it’s distress, which
is hardly in the person’s best interest. So,
you know, we are quite sanguine I suppose
about the fact we are killing them, but we’re
doing it in a very slow and laborious and
nasty way.26
Another consultant neurologist—reflecting on his
response to a young adult PermVS patient who was the
subject of a court case for withdrawal of CANH which was
eventually approved—was even more forthright: ‘‘I used to
sometimes stand and look at him and think, ‘if you were
my son I would kill you right now with my own two
hands’. I really felt that, because it’s just awful.’’
Such views—explored more fully in Kitzinger and
Kitzinger (2014)—raise the question as to whether other
ways of dealing with these patients should be permitted,
alongside withdrawing CANH. We argue that our data
support the case for reconsidering active euthanasia spe-
cifically for PermVS patients as one of the options to be
debated.27 Many relatives strongly believe that actively
24 It is important to note that there are relatives of patients diagnosed
as PermVS by clinicians who want the patient to be maintained in
their current state. Thus far, in every case in our sample this is either
because the family do not believe that the patient currently lacks, or
do believe that the patient will recover, consciousness (and sometimes
of course they are right).
25 Re Quinlan, NJ 355 A 2d 647 (1976); Cruzan v Director, Missouri
Department of Health, 497 US 261 (1990); Bush v Schiavo, 885 So 2d
321, 324 (Fla 2004); Airedale NHS Trust v Bland [1993].
26 These exchanges raise interesting issues we do not have space to
pursue here, such as how to make sense of the fact that PermVS
patients receive morphine despite being diagnosed as lacking
conscious awareness, and how the doctrine of double effect applies
to the ethics of ‘terminal sedation’ of PermVS patients.
27 The terminological difficulty explained in n. 23 is clearly
prominent here: we use the term ‘euthanasia’ for convenience and
with no implication that the PermVS patient is straightforwardly
alive.
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euthanizing PermVS patients is more in the latter’s inter-
ests than is the current method of withdrawing CANH; this
in itself counts in favour of permitting this option. Fur-
thermore, the case for considering active euthanasia for
PermVS patients is strengthened by our analysis of their
ontological status. In particular, that permanently vegeta-
tive patients are in an unclear ontological state weakens
arguments against permitting active euthanasia for them.
We have space here to provide two illustrative examples.28
A standard objection to permitting active euthanasia for
any class of patients, including PermVS patients, is that it
will create a slippery slope to objectionable killings. There
are standard responses within the literature, such as the
lack of evidence of a slippery slope from health care sys-
tems that permit forms of active euthanasia (Marquet et al.
2003). Our response is different. A logical slippery slope
exists when the reasons for acting in one case also apply to
another case; a psychological slippery slope exists when,
even though two cases are logically distinct, agents have a
psychological predisposition—no doubt grounded in socio-
cultural institutions—to slide from one to the other. Our
claim that PermVS and MCS are dissimilar in a distinctive
way—namely, they are ontologically dissimilar—adds
further confirmation that these patients/conditions are log-
ically distinct: i.e., no logical slippery slope exists from
PermVS to MCS so the reasons for acting in the one case
do not apply to the other case.29 In turn, this weakens the
claim that there is a psychological slippery slope from, say,
permitting active euthanasia for PermVS patients to killing
MCS patients.30
Another standard objection to active euthanasia is that the
distinction between active and passive euthanasia maps onto
the distinction between killing and letting die, killing is
worse than letting die, so passive euthanasia is permissible,
but active euthanasia is not. Again, there are familiar
responses in the literature, such as that the killing/letting die
distinction cannot be maintained (Brody 1992; cf. Kopelman
2007) and that killing and letting die are morally equivalent
(Rachels 1975; Tooley 1980; cf. Nesbitt 1995; Hanser 1999).
Again, our argument is different. The distinctions between
active and passive euthanasia, and between killing and let-
ting die, are less pertinent in the case of patients whose
ontological status is unclear, than in cases of patients who are
straightforwardly alive. This is because the point of the
appeal to the killing/letting die distinction is to avoid agents
actively ending innocent people’s lives. But a PermVS
patient is not straightforwardly alive in the first place; in turn,
it is unclear what moral work the killing/letting die distinc-
tion could do in this particular case. It is not providing a
bulwark against killing innocent people because the PermVS
patient is not a standard victim of a killing; rather, they are a
patient in an unavoidably unclear ontological state who is not
straightforwardly alive, and who currently can be legally
treated in such a way as to ensure that their ontological status
is that of being straightforwardly dead.
In sum, our analysis suggests that we debate the possi-
bility of active euthanasia as a legally permitted option for
PermVS patients. Of course, on the basis of considerations
such as best interest and autonomy, active euthanasia might
be declined in favour of other forms of treatment. For
example, it might be decided that a patient ought to be
maintained in their current vegetative state, or allowed to
die by withdrawing CANH, on the strength of their pre-
vious religious convictions and other strongly held values
and beliefs.31 Nonetheless, we are sympathetic to a ‘shift of
burden’ advocated by some bioethicists: i.e., changing
from the current default position often adopted of assuming
that life-sustaining interventions will be continued, whilst
allowing applications for withdrawal, to assuming life-
sustaining interventions will be discontinued after a clearly
specified period, whilst allowing applications for their
continuation (Angell 1994; Constable 2012).
Concluding remarks
Empirical data support the view presented in Holland
(2010) that the ontological state of permanently vegetative
28 Others include the sanctity of life principle. The principle states
that life is worthy of respect (although someone who adheres to the
sanctity of life principle might acknowledge that there are times to
allow death, e.g., by appealing to the doctrine of the double effect, or
the distinction between proportionate and disproportionate interven-
tions). The hidden premise in all versions of the principle, even
secular ones, is that the individual in question is clearly alive; we
suggest that application of the principle to PermVS patients is
compromised by their unclear ontological status.
29 Opponents of euthanasia may continue to make the slippery slope
objection to the suggestion that active euthanasia be allowed for
PermVS patients, notwithstanding our argument. After all, psycho-
logical predispositions can be obdurate; and diagnostic uncertainties
surrounding chronic disorders of consciousness encourage slippery
slope worries (e.g., people with minimal consciousness may indeed
have had CANH withdrawn because their state was seen as ‘very like’
a vegetative patient; see Huxtable 2013, p. 51ff). Nonetheless, the
slippery slope argument against euthanasia is weakened and requires
modifying in light of the finding that PermVS patients have a
distinctive ontological status.
30 Although our argument does not rule out permitting active
euthanasia for certain patients who are clearly alive, such as MCS
patients, that discussion has yet to be had and, obviously, will not
centre on the issue of ontological status. In passing we note that not
even passive euthanasia has so far been permitted by the English
courts for patients diagnosed as being in MCS (Re M; W v M (2011)).
31 Hence we acknowledge and accommodate evidence that some
conscious and competent patients choose to refuse food and fluids in
order to hasten their death, despite the availability of more active
methods, such as physician assisted suicide (Ganzini et al. 2003).
Evidence from families and experts
123
patients is unclear: they are neither straightforwardly alive
nor straightforwardly dead. Some relatives and experts take
the view that the least worst option in this situation would
be to shift patients from their currently unclear ontological
state to that of being clearly dead. But many are concerned,
or even horrified, by the prospect of the only legally
sanctioned method guaranteed to achieve this, namely
withdrawal of clinically assisted nutrition and hydration.
Our analysis supports the case for debating a policy of
allowing active euthanasia for PermVS patients (subject to
all the sort of safeguards that are now or will be in the
future put in place for allowing their deaths from treatment
withdrawal). Views expressed in interviews provide a
reason in favour of this legal and social policy change,
which would be more acceptable to some families, less
distressing for them, and more likely to allow them to go
along with a ‘best interests’ decision which respects a
patients’ prior expressed wishes. Additionally, objections
to allowing active euthanasia—for example, based on
putative slippery slopes or the killing/letting die distinc-
tion—are compromised by the distinctive ontological sta-
tus of PermVS patients.
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